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I. INTRODUCTION
What happens to all that information you are required to provide to
Amazon when you buy that new shirt? Do they keep your address, credit
card number, and phone number on a secure, encrypted server? When you
accept the user-agreement for iTunes, which you undoubtedly fail to read,
what protections does Apple provide to keep your information safe? As
consumers increasingly use the internet to make everyday purchases and
businesses increasingly collect and store consumer information, protections
need to be put in place to ensure that this information is stored in a way that
limits and prevents threats from cybercrime.
An October 2015 study by the Ponemon Institute determined that the
average annual cost of cybercrime in the United States is $15.42 million per
United States company-an increase from $12.69 million only a year ago.'
As the threat of cybersecurity breaches to consumers continues to increase,
and costs associated with that threat continue to rise, businesses must find
ways to mitigate these damages. But when businesses fail to provide
adequate protections, should the government step in? In response to the
myriad of attacks, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may be the
regulatory arm of the federal government with the arsenal to affect the
change needed to combat the millions of dollars spent every year on
cybercrime. But does the FTC have the authority to hold businesses
accountable? A mixture of administrative adjudications and a recent court
decision suggest that it does.
Recently, the Third Circuit ruled that the FTC has the authority under the
unfairness prong of the Federal Trade Commission Ace (FTCA) to regulate
and fine businesses that lose consumer information to hackers where the
company fails to provide adequate safeguards to the businesses' consumer
information stored online.' The decision stems from the FTC's decision to
sue Wyndham Hotels for allowing three cyberattacks that resulted in the theft
of more than 600,000 consumers' credit card information and over $10
million in fraudulent charges.4 This is not the first time that the FTC has
gone after businesses for issues related to cybersecurity; in fact, the FTC has
settled over fifty cases against companies for cybersecurity matters,
Ponemon Institute, 2015 Cost of Cyber Crime Study (Oct. 2015), https://ssl.www8.hp.
com/ww/en/secure/pdf/4aa5-5207enw.pdf.
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006) (prohibition against "unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce").
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
4 Id. at 240.
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including SnapChat Inc., Reed Elsevier Inc., and Credit Karma Inc.5
Wyndham is the first to challenge the FTC's blanket authority, refusing to
succumb to pressures to settle.
Companies found liable under the unfairness prong of the FTCA could
face the multitude of tools available to the FTC, and, given that the threats of
cybersecurity show no signs of slowing down, businesses simply cannot
ignore the potential liability. In short, this decision may have serious
consequences for companies like Wyndham that store consumer
information-far greater than upset consumers and public embarrassment.6
On September 15, 2015, Experian disclosed that an unauthorized party had
hacked its system, subjecting data collected between September 2013 and
September 2015 to potential fraudulent exposure.7 While this hack did not
obtain credit card information, it did collect a variety of highly sensitive
information, including names, addresses, Social Security numbers, dates-of-
birth, and identification numbers found on drivers' licenses, military lIDs, and
8
passports. This breach prompted three U.S. Senators to demand answers
from Experian and may eventually lead to liability, much like the potential
liability faced by Wyndham.9
U.S. Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) - ranking member of the
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs - today demanded answers from Experian, the world's
largest credit monitoring firm, on actions the company is taking
to address the recent security breach that exposed sensitive
personal data of about 15 million T-Mobile customers.10
And the list goes on: Primera Blue Cross, in March of 2015, was
breached, exposing 11 million customers' names, dates-of-birth, Social
Security numbers, mail and e-mail addresses, phone numbers, and bank
s See Sophia Pearson, Wyndham Must Face Hacker Suit as Court Upholds FTC Power,
BLOOMBERG TECH. (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-24/wy
ndham-must-face-ftc-suit-for-failing-to-stop-russian-hackers.
6 See generally Andy Greenberg, Court Says that FTC can Slap Companies for Getting
Hacked, WIRED (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/court-says-ftc-can-slap-com
pames-getting-hacked/.
7 Eric Chabrow, Experian Hack Slams T-Mobile Customers, DATA BREACH TODAY (Oct. 1,
2015), http://www.databreachtoday.com/experian-hack-slams-t-mobile-customers-a-8563.
8 Id.
9 Press Release, U.S. Sen. Sherrod Brown (OH), Brown Presses Experian for Answer
Following Security Breach of 15 Million Consumers' Personal Data (Oct. 14, 2015), http://
www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-presses-experian-for-answer-followin
g-security-breach-of-15-million-consumers-personal-data.
10 Id.
379
GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
account information and Anthem, in February 2015, permitted 80 million
records of current and former customers (and employees) to be breached,
allowing access to names, Social Security numbers, dates-of-birth, addresses,
e-mail, and employment information (including income data)."
While the cost of having greater security measures will undoubtedly
increase the internal costs to businesses and eventually be passed on to the
consumer, a response from the FTC to these ever-increasing cyber-related
crimes seems to be imminent, given the circumstances. And while
consumers may bear the eventual cost of better cyber protection, it is
conceivable that increased protections may diminish or severely undercut the
costs already borne by consumers as the result of the ongoing cyberattacks.
This Note aims to provide a deeper understanding of the current status of
cybercrime in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. By
analyzing these common law countries' regulatory and statutory schemes
aimed at combatting cybercrime, this Note attempts to explore whether the
United States can, and should, allow the FTC to regulate businesses'
cybersecurity protections. Part II of this Note discusses the recent Third
Circuit opinion, which arguably strengthens the FTC's position that it has the
right to assess and fine businesses that fail to provide adequate safeguards
promised to consumers. Part II provides a synopsis of opinions after the
Third Circuit decision to highlight the relevant concerns regarding business
and consumer information as it relates to the collection of consumer
protection.
Part IV provides a basis for comparison, by examining what other
common law countries, particularly Australia and the United Kingdom, are
doing to combat cybercrime. This includes exploring the statutory and
regulatory schemes of both countries to see whether the concerns regarding
FTC regulatory oversight have merit, and whether governmental regulation
seems to provide the necessary supervision to combat cybercrime.
Moreover, this section explores some cases in each country to determine how
the respective courts are involved in this process.
Part V makes suggestions about what the government should be doing to
effectively hold businesses accountable, while also encouraging businesses
to adopt systems that can undercut attackers' ability to take sensitive
information stored online. Finally, Part VI provides a brief conclusion with
some final thoughts about how Wyndham may help bring about the necessary
change for the United States to effectively target computer hackers.
11 See Kevin Granville, 9 Recent Cyberattacks Against Big Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/02/05/technology/recent-cyberattacks.html?_
r-0.
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II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF FTC V. WYNDHAM
In order to provide a deeper understanding of the FTC's ability to regulate
cybersecurity-particularly as compared to what other common law
countries like Australia and the United Kingdom are doing to regulate these
threats-it is important to understand how the FTC is holding businesses
accountable. Until 2014, no company had seriously resisted the FTC's
decision to hold businesses responsible under the unfairness prong of the
FTCA.1 2  This section provides the backdrop for comparing how the
respective regulatory and judicial entities of each country fare when dealing
with cybersecurity breaches as the result of inadequate safeguards by
businesses.
As such, this section explores the Third Circuit opinion FTC v. Wyndham
Hotels, starting first with the factual background, then examining how the
Third Circuit dealt with the three arguments made by Wyndham. The Third
Circuit agreed to hear an immediate appeal on two issues: "whether the FTC
has authority to regulate cybersecurity under the unfairness prong of § 45(a);
and, if so, whether Wyndham had fair notice that its specific cybersecurity
could fall short of that provision." 3
A. Wyndham's Cybersecurity Breaches
Wyndham Worldwide, a hospitality company that manages hotels and
sells timeshares through subsidiaries, licensed its brand name to
approximately ninety independently owned hotels.1 4 Each of these hotels
utilized a property management system that stored a variety of consumer
information, including names, home addresses, e-mail addresses, telephone
numbers, credit card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes." This
information was stored in a system that according to the FTC, would easily
allow it.16 Notably, the system stored this information in an unencrypted
clear readable text format without any sort of firewall in place to limit
12 See Alison Grande, LabMD Ruling Puts FTC in Driver's Seat on Data Security, LAw360
(May 13, 2014, 8:41 PM), https://www.bakerdonelson.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Law36
0%20-%2OBrad%20Clanton%20quote%205-13-14%20LabMD%2ORuling%2OPuts%20FTC
%201n%20Driver's%2OSeat%200n%2OData%20Security.pdf.
'3 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp, 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
14 id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 240-41 (according to the FTC complaint, this included: (1) storing information in
clear, readable text; (2) easy-to-guess passwords to storage systems; (3) lack of firewalls; (4)
easily accessible information through non-secure servers; (5) and poor incident response
procedures, among others).
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access.17 As the FTC charged, the system, developed by Micros Systems,
Inc., allowed someone to easily predict the log-in credentials since the user
ID and password were both "micros."
On three separate occasions throughout 2008 and 2009, hackers accessed
Wyndham's system with relative ease. First, in April 2008, hackers broke
into the local network of an Arizona hotel that was connected to Wyndham's
internet network. 9 This enabled the hackers to obtain the information of
over 500,000 consumers' accounts, which they then sent to a domain in
Russia.2 0  Then, in March 2009, hackers gained access through an
administrative account and obtained unencrypted credit card information for
nearly 50,000 consumers from nearly forty hotels.2 1 It was not until this
point that Wyndham discovered "memory-scraping malware" that was used
in the previous attack on more than thirty hotel computer systems.2 2 The
hackers made the third attack in March 2009, again through the use of an
administrator account on one of the company's networks.23 Wyndham only
learned of this final attack in January 2010, after receiving a number of
24 ti
complaints from cardholders about fraudulent activity. In this third attack,
the hackers obtained credit card information for over 69,000 consumers from
almost thirty hotels.2 5 According to the FTC, during the course of the three
attacks, the hackers obtained credit card information from over 619,000
consumers, resulting in at least $10.6 million in fraudulent transactions.2 6
Given these inadequate safeguards, the FTC maintained that Wyndham
failed to employ "reasonable measures to detect and prevent unauthorized
access" to its computer network or to "conduct security investigations."27
Wyndham's published privacy policy, however, touts that the company
promises to use encryption, firewalls, and other safeguards to protect
consumer data; likewise, it states that the company safeguards consumer data
"using industry-standard practices." 28 The FTC argues that this lack of
security despite affirmations to the contrary amounts to an "unfair" business
17 Id at 241.
18 Id. (paragraph 24 of the FTC complaint).19 Id at 240.
20 Id at 241-42.
21 Id at 242.
22 id.
23 Id
24 id
25 id
26 id
27 Id at 258.
28 Id at 241 (paragraph 21 of the FTC complaint); for the full language of the privacy
policy, see Wyndham Hotel Group, LLC, Privacy Policy, https://m.wyndham.com/about/priva
cy-policy.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
382 [Vol. 45:377
2017] FTC REGULATING CYBERSECURITY POST WYNDHAM
practice in violation of the FTCA's unfairness prong.29 While Congress
currently has a number of bills in consideration that would establish national
standards for protecting consumer data, until any legislation is in place these
FTC decisions will be establishing national security standards.30
B. Third Circuit Decision
On August 24, 2015, the Third Circuit in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide
Corp3 1 determined that the FTC has broad power to regulate cybersecurity
under the FTCA unfairness prong.32 In order for the FTC to advance under
this prong, it must show three factors: (1) that the injury was substantial; (2)
that the countervailing benefits to consumer or competition are not
outweighed; and (3) that the injury was one that a reasonable consumers
could not have avoided. 3 In 1994, Congress codified this test directly into
the FTCA:
The Commission shall have no authority under this
section ... to declare unlawful an act or practice on the
grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or
practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or
practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established
public policies as evidence to be considered with all other
evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a
primary basis for such determination.34
29 Id. at 240 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006)).
30 Some of the proposed legislation includes the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection
Act (originally introduced as H.R. 3523-it was reintroduced in 2015 as H.R. 234 and has
been referred to two committees for consideration), which was introduced in the House, and
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (originally introduced as S. 2588-reintroduced as
S. 754 in March 2015 and is under consideration by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence), introduced in the Senate.
1799 F.3d at 236.
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
33 Originally this provision was part of a policy statement issued in 1980 that was appended
to International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984). The current language was
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) in 1994 as part of the FTCA Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-312, § 9, 108 Stat. 1691, 1695.
34 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9, 108 Stat. 1691, 1695 (1994 Amendment).
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According to Wyndham, the FTC does not have authority to regulate a
business's cybersecurity for three main reasons: (1) the plain meaning of
unfairness does not apply to cybersecurity; (2) congressional intent and
action have diminished the FTC's ability to regulate cybersecurity under the
FTCA; and (3) the FTCA has failed to provide fair notice to businesses as to
what constitutes adequate protection.35
1. Plain Meaning of Unfairness
First, Wyndham argued that the "three requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)
are necessary but insufficient conditions of an unfair practice and the plain
meaning of the word 'unfair' imposes independent requirements that are not
met here." 36 The court acknowledged that "arguably" § 45(n) may not
identify all the requirements for an unfairness claim and that "this analysis of
unfairness encompasses some facts relevant to the FTC's deceptive practices
claim." 37 Nonetheless, the court opined that since unfairness and deception
claims frequently overlap, the court "cannot completely disentangle the two
theories";3 therefore, so long as Wyndham's conduct satisfies the reasonably
avoidable requirements by way of the privacy policy, then an inference can
39be made that the policy was unfair to consumers.
Next, Wyndham posited "that a business does not treat its customers in an
unfair manner when the business itself is victimized by criminals."40 The
court quickly dismissed this argument by noting first that there is no
authority to support this proposition; but then, relying on the express
language of the Act, the court noted that the FTCA expressly contemplates
the possibility that a business's conduct could be considered unfair before
any actual injury results.4 '
Finally, Wyndham maintained that if the FTC's unfairness authority
extends to Wyndham's conduct, then the FTC will effectively have the
ability to "regulate the locks on hotel room doors" or even "sue supermarkets
35 Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 244 (plain meaning); id at 247 (subsequent congressional action);
id at 249 (fair notice).
36 Id. at 244.
37 Id. at 244-45.
38 Id. at 245, citing Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.3d 957, 980 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
("The FTC has determined that . .. making unsubstantiated advertising claims may be both an
unfair and a deceptive practice."), and Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.3d 1354, 1366
(11th Cir. 1988) ("[A] practice may be both deceptive and unfair .
39 Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 246.
40 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
41 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(n): "[An unfair act or practice] causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury.").
[Vol. 45:377384
2017] FTC REGULATING CYBERSECURITY POST WYNDHAM
that are sloppy about sweeping up banana peels.'A2  The court sharply
rejected this argument, noting that "it invites the tart retort that, were
Wyndham a supermarket, leaving so many banana peels all over the place
that 619,000 customers fall hardly suggests it should be immune from
liability under § 45(a)."A Accordingly, the court determined that it was "not
persuaded by Wyndham's arguments that the alleged conduct falls outside
the plain meaning of 'unfair.' "
2. Congressional Intent and Action
Wyndham next argued that the Fair Credit Report Act,45 the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act,46 and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act47 have
"reshaped [the unfairness prong's] meaning to exclude cybersecurity"-in
short, "Wyndham concludes that Congress excluded cybersecurity from the
FTC's unfairness authority by enacting these [three] measures."" After
briefly discussing each of the three Acts, the Third Circuit determined that
none of the recent privacy legislation diminishes the FTC's ability to regulate
just because the FTC already has some authority to regulate corporate
cybersecurity.4 9
Wyndham then argued that the FTC's decision to bring this action under
the unfairness prong is "inconsistent with its repeated efforts to obtain from
Congress the very authority it purports to wield here."o After discussing
various policy decisions from the late 1990s and early 2000s, where the FTC
acknowledged that it could not require businesses to adopt fair information
practice policies, the court found "that the FTC later brought unfairness
actions against companies whose inadequate cybersecurity resulted in
consumer harm is not inconsistent with the agency's earlier position."51
Therefore, "[h]aving rejected Wyndham's arguments that its conduct cannot
42 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
43 Id at 247.
44Id.
45 See Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 216(a), 117 Stat. 1952, 1985-86 (2003); codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1681w.
4 See Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 501(b), 113 Stat. 1338, 1436-37 (1999); codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b).
47 See Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1303, 113 Stat. 2681, 2681, 2730-32 (1998); codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6502).
48 Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 247.
49 Id. at 247-49.
50 Id. at 248.
51 Id. at 249.
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be unfair [the court] assume[d] for the remainder of [the] opinion that it was
[fair]."52
3. Fair Notice
Finally, Wyndham relied on an argument espoused by most companies
under attack by the FTC: that the § 45(a) does not provide "fair notice" of the
cybersecurity standards it was required to implement. Here, Wyndham's
argument focused on the FTC's motion to dismiss order in LabMD," an
administrative case in which the agency is pursuing an unfairness claim
based on allegedly inadequate cybersecurity, protections.54 In short,
Wyndham advanced a number of arguments, all of which seek to deny the
FTC Chevron deference5 5 based on the LabMD case. Despite the seven
separate sub-arguments that Wyndham made regarding Chevron deference,
the Third Circuit determined that since the District Court concluded the FTC
had advanced a claim under § 45(a) based on an interpretation of the statute
and without any reference to LabMD or any other adjudication, this
argument was unavailing.56  As such, the "relevant question" became
"whether Wyndham had fair notice that its conduct could fall within the
meaning of the statute."57 The court determined that Wyndham's briefs
argued that the company "lacked notice of what specific cybersecurity
practices [were].necessary to avoid liability."5  The court had "little trouble
rejecting this claim." Given that the unfairness prong does not involve any
constitutional rights, it is a civil rather than criminal statute, and it regulates
economic activity, the court determined that "Wyndham [was] entitled to a
relatively low level of statutory notice." 59 Given the arguments advanced by
Wyndham, the Third Circuit determined that the fair notice had to be
"reviewed as an as-applied challenge."60 Under this challenge, the court
found that the cost-benefit analysis fell in favor of the FTC.6 '
52 id
53 In re LabMD, Inc., 2015 WL 5304118 (F.T.C. 2015).
54 Id. at 253.
55 A reference to an agency's authority to fill gaps in a statutory scheme; in short, allowing
the agency that is primarily responsible for interpreting the statute to fill gaps because the
courts must defer to any reasonable construction it adopts. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
56 Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 253-54.
17 Id. at 255.
58 Id.
59 Id.
6 Id. at 256. For a deeper understanding of "as-applied challenges," see United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975).
61 Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 256.
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The Third Circuit rejected Wyndham's arguments, maintaining that:
[A] company does not act equitably when it published a
privacy policy to attract customers who are concerned about
data privacy, fails to make good on that promise by investing
inadequate resources in cybersecurity, exposes it unsuspecting
customers to substantial financial injury, and retains the profits
of their business.62
It is not exactly clear why the FTC did not advance this claim under its
deceptive prong,63 since, particularly in the case of Wyndham, the FTC could
plausibly argue that the privacy policy posted on the website was deceptive
to consumers. The Third Circuit's analysis seemingly finds that the FTC
could have brought an action against Wyndham under either the deceptive or
unfairness prong. 4 Moreover, as one article suggests, "[d]eception claims
are standard fare in the 50 plus cybersecurity consent decrees that the FTC
has obtained to date, as well as in hundreds of other FTC consumer
protection actions, most notably in the advertising and marketing context." 65
Arguably, the most likely reason that the FTC has begun bringing
cybersecurity related enforcement actions under the unfairness prong is
because, unlike the deception prong, no faulty representation must be shown
by the FTC in order to advance a claim under the unfairness prong.66
The dispute is far from over. The Third Circuit only addressed whether
the FTC had standing to enforce this action; the court's determination simply
allows the case to proceed at the district court level. To that end, Wyndham
maintains that the company did right by its consumers:
Once the discovery process resumes, we believe the facts will
show the FTC's allegations are unfounded. Safeguarding
personal information remains a top priority for our company,
62 Id. at 245.
61 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006); see also Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 259, n.4 for additional insight
regarding the relationship between the unfair and deceptive prongs of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
64 Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 245.
65 See Aravind Swaminathan, Antony P. Kim & Emily S. Tabatabai, Third Circuit to
Wyndham (Part II), ORRICK (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publicat
ions/Pages/Tird-Circuit-to-Wyndham-Part-H-Deceptive-is-also-Unfair-in-the-Cybersecurity-
Context.aspx.
66 See J. Howard Beales, Former FTC Director, The FTC's Use of Unfairness Authority,
presented at the Marketing and Public Policy Conference (May 30, 2003), https://www.ftc.
gov/public-statements/2003/05/fts-use-unfairness-authority-its-rise-fall-and-resurrection.
3872017]
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and with the dramatic increase in the number and severity of
cyberattacks on both public and private institutions, we believe
consumers will be best served by the government and
businesses working together collaboratively rather than as
adversaries.67
Given this relatively new practice by the FTC, many have begun to
question-much like Wyndham Hotels-whether the FTC has the authority
to hold businesses accountable under the unfairness prong. Additionally, the
FTC's added push to go after businesses who have failed to adequately
safeguard consumer information may have significant consequences on
businesses' financial overhead and, invariably, on the costs borne by
consumers. Much debate has circulated after the Third Circuit's decision
and the next section examines part of that debate.
III. POST- WYNDHAM CRITIQUE
The Third Circuit's decision faced mixed reviews. Some argue that the
decision is far too expansive, effectively broadening the FTC's reach beyond
congressional intent. Others have praised the decision, finding that the
court's assessment is consistent with the purposes of the FTCA and is
necessary given the nature of consumer transactions in modern society.
According to Alan Butler, an attorney for Electronic Privacy Information
Center who filed an amicus brief in Wyndham, "[t]his is a huge victory for
the FTC, but also for American consumers [since we continue to] see
services and companies being hacked on an almost daily basis now. Having
the FTC out there, bringing actions against companies that fail to protect
consumers' data is a critical tool." 6 8 To others, the Third Circuit's decision
merely dispels any confusion about the FTC's ability to be a "data security
watchdog." 6 9 As Berkeley Law Professor Chris Hoofnagle put it, "[t]he law
has always imposed responsibility on companies for the care of their
customers. When you're in the restaurant you have to protect against slips
67 Statement by Michael Valentino, Vice President of Marketing and Communications at
Wyndham. See John K. Higgins, Court Bolsters FTC's Authority to Regulate Cybersecurity,
E-COMMERCE TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/82496.html.
68 See Greenberg, supra note 6.
69 Alison Grande, 3rd Circ. Backs FTC in Data Security Row with Wyndham, LAw360
(Aug. 24, 2015, 12:10 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/664545/3rd-circ-backs-ftc-in-da
ta-security-row-with-wyndham.
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and falls or food-borne illness."70 Now, "[d]ata is just something new that
companies have to protect if they want to bear the benefits of collecting it."7 1
FTC Chairperson Edith Ramirez maintains that the decision "reaffirms
the FTC's authority to hold companies accountable for failing to safeguard
consumer data ... it is not only appropriate, but critical that the FTC has the
ability to take action on behalf of consumers when companies fail to take
reasonable steps to secure sensitive consumer information." 72 According to
Eric Chiu, the President and Co-founder of HyTrust, a cloud security
automation company specializing in security, compliance, and control
software, 7 3 "[c]onsumers have been paying the price for security breaches for
too long. Hopefully, the FTC can help put greater pressure on companies to
do the right thing." 74
In a statement issued after the Third Circuit's decision, Wyndham
criticized the court, stating "we continue to contend that the FTC lacks the
authority to pursue this type of case against American businesses, and has
failed to publish any regulations that would give such businesses fair notice
of any proposed standards for data security." 7 5 To this point the FTC has not
published any guidance documents particularly addressing how businesses
should craft protections against cybercrime in order to avoid regulation
action under the unfairness prong. However, as the Third Circuit noted in
Wyndham, the FTC issued a guidebook in 2007, Protecting Personal
Information: A Guide for Business, which provides businesses like
Wyndham a "checklist" of practices that form a "sound data security plan." 76
While the guidebook does not provide any required practice as it pertains to
§ 45(a), it does make a number of suggestions:
70 id.
71 id.
72 Grant Gross, Court: FTC Can Bring Down the Hammer on Companies with Sloppy
Cybersecurity, PC WORLD (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2974771/appeals
-court-denies-challenge-to-ftcs-cybersecurity-enforcement.htmil.
7 Company Overview of HyTrust, Inc., BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/research/
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapld=51793323.
74 Aaron Boyd, Should FTC Regulate Commercial Cybersecurity?, FED. TIMES (Aug. 25,
2015), http://www.federaltimes.com/story/government/cybersecurity/ 2 015/08/25/ftc-wyndham/
32331697/.
7 Higgins, supra note 67 (Statement by Michael Valentino, Vice President of Marketing and
Communications for Wyndham); see also Sophia Pearson, Wyndham Must Face Hacker Suit as
Court Upholds FTC Power, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-08-24/wyndham-must-face-ftc-suit-for-failing-to-stop-russian-hackers.
76 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp, 799 F.3d 236, 256 (3d Cir. 2015), https://www.ftc.
gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0 1 36 protecting-personal-information.pdf.
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* Identify all connections to the computers where you store
sensitive information.
* Encrypt sensitive information that you send to third parties
over public networks (like the internet), and consider
encrypting sensitive information that is stored on your
computer network or on disks or portable storage devices
used by your employees.
* When you receive or transmit credit card information or
other sensitive financial data, use Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) or another secure connection that protects the
information in transit.
* Use firewall to protect your computer from hacker attacks
while it is connected to the internet. . . A properly
configured firewall makes it tougher for hackers to locate
your computer and get into your program and files.
* Control access to sensitive information by requiring that
employees use "strong" passwords.
* To detect breaches when they occur, consider using an
intrusion detection system. To be effective, it must be
updated frequently to address new types of hacking.
Regardless, according to Wyndham this decision pushes the limits too far,
allowing the FTC "to regulate the locks on hotel room doors." 7 8 And as the
Wyndham court noted, had the hotel followed some of these items from the
checklist, it "could certainly have helped Wyndham determine in advance
that its conduct might not survive the cost-benefit analysis."79
Michael Daugherty, CEO of LabMD, was in the same camp as Wyndham
and has been incredibly critical of the FTC, having fought actions against the
FTC that have crippled his company and forced massive rounds of layoffs.so
LabMD is currently under fire from the FTC as it faces allegations that the
company failed to reasonably protect the security of consumers' personal
data, including a mixture of medical information.8 ' According to the FTC
complaint, LabMD collectively exposed 10,000 consumers in two separate
incidents after billing information from over 9,000 consumers was found on
a file-sharing network, and documents containing sensitive personal
77 id
78 See Pearson, supra note 75.
7 Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 257.80 Boyd, supra note 74.
81 See In re LabMD, 2015 WL 5304118 (F.T.C. 2015).
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information of at least 500 consumers were found in the hands of identity
thieves.82 Nonetheless, to Daugherty the "FTC wants to become the number
one self-appointed cybersecurity regulater; [and in the process the] FTC is
creating common law [around cybersecurity]-get[ting] the consent decrees;
build[ing] precedent; avoid[ing] the courts; mislead[ing] and stonewall[ing]
congress [sic]; and play[ing] hero to the press."
Even with the guidebook in place, these contentions from Daugherty and
Wyndham raise relevant concerns. FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny
admitted that the FTC was making decisions about what constitutes strong
cybersecurity for the private sector despite having commissioners who are
not particularly educated in what constitute strong cybersecurity measures.84
However, McSweeny did note that the FTC relies heavily on the expertise of
individuals, like Ashkan Soltani, the FTC's chief technologist.85 Moreover,
McSweeny urged individuals to get involved to help shape the regulatory
policy given the uncertainty in the field.
IV. How OTHER COMMON LAW COUNTRIES HANDLE CYBERSECURITY
The United States is not alone in facing substantial costs and threats from
cyber-attacks. The United Kingdom also saw an increase from $5.93 million
last year to $6.32 this year. Australia saw a slight decrease from $3.99
million to $3.47 million," but this is still a sizeable loss when the costs to
businesses and consumers are considered. The staggering amount of damage
stemming from cybersecurity breaches suggests the imminent need for
regulatory oversight in all affected countries. The threats are serious and are
of increasing concern to Australia's public and private sector. "Concerns
about cyber risk have become the biggest concern for Australian insurance
companies, jumping from 19th place four years ago to the top ranking in
2005. And it looks like the industry is bracing for sustained attack by cyber
criminals."89
82 id
83 Boyd, supra note 74.
4 Id.
8 Id.
86 Id.
87 See Ponemon Institute, supra note 1.
88 Id.
89 Simon Thomsen, Cyber security is now the biggest risk worrying Australian insurers,
Bus. INSIDER AUSTRALIA (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/cyber-security-
is-now-the-biggest-risk-worrying-australian-insurers-2015-8.
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A. Australia and Cybersecurity
Australia, like the United States and the United Kingdom, has both
regulatory and statutory provisions in place to combat threats to
cybersecurity. This section outlines how Australia uses government
initiatives, regulatory action, and the courts to hold businesses accountable
for unfair business practices resulting in cybersecurity breaches. The section
concludes with an Australian case study as a basis for comparing the
Wyndham decision and the effects that the cybersecurity breaches have on
both the businesses in Australia as well as the consumers.
1. The Australian Approach
In 2009, the Australian government released a "Cyber Security Strategy"
in response to the Prime Minister's indication that the issue of cybersecurity
is "now one of Australia's top tier national security priorities."90 Notably,
Australia's plan regarding cybersecurity seems to be more focused on
education, rather than regulation.9 '
In order to meet these policy goals, the Australian government started two
mutually supportive organizations: Australian Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT) and the Cyber Security Operations Centre
(CSOC). 9 2 Australia's CERT is designed to "be the national coordination
point within the Australian Government for the provision of cyber security
information and advice for the Australian community and be the official
point of contact in the expanding global community of national CERTs to
support more effective international cooperation." 9 3 The CSOC "provides
the Australian Government with all-source cyber situational awareness and
an enhanced ability to facilitate operational responses to cybersecurity events
of national importance," and "will identify and analyse sophisticated cyber
90 Australian Government, CYBER SECURTY STRATEGY, at v (2009), https://www.ag.gov.
au/RightsAndProtections/CyberSecurity/Documents/AG%20Cyber%2OSecurity%2OStrategy
%20-%20for%20website.pdf.
91 See id. ("While the Australian Government's cyber security policy is primarily concerned
with the availability, integrity and confidentiality of Australia's ICT, it must be coordinated
with those of other related policies and programs such as cyber safety which is focused on
helping to protect individuals, especially children, from exposure to illegal and offensive
content, cyber-bullying, stalking, and grooming online for the purposes of sexual
exploitation.").
Id. at vii.
93id
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attacks, and assist in responses to cyber events across government and
critical private sector systems and infrastructure." 94
In March 2014, the Australian government issued a set of consolidated
principles called the Australian Privacy Principals (APPs) that govern
privacy and data protection throughout the country and significantly enhance
regulatory protection and enforcement through the Office of the Australian
Information Commissioner (OAIC).9 ' Notably, the APPs allow the
Information Commissioner to "assess whether personal information is being
handled in accordance with the APPs or relevant legislation," and, if not, to
grant the OAIC "the ability to apply the federal Magistrates Court to seek a
civil penalty where an individual or company has breached a civil penalty
provision of the privacy legislation."9 6
Under the watch of Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority
(APRA),9 7 "a business must have clear accountability and communication
strategies to limit the effect of data breaches."98 In the event of a breach,
APRA expects that businesses will notify the Authority of any major security
incidents.99 Even companies that fall outside the government's reach under
the APPs-companies that have licenses with the Australian Financial
Services but that are not regulated by the APRA-must still have "adequate
technological resources to provide financial services covered by the license
and adequate risk management systems."' 00
Scholars on the subject think that organizations that allow for large
breaches may face charges outside the APPs. "Current common law and
statutory duties imposed on directors in Australia may . .. be interpreted to
apply to data breaches in certain circumstances. Directors should give
particular regard to their duties of continuous disclosure and the duty of care
94 id
9s The OAIC is an independent agency acting as the national data protection authority in
Australia. See Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010, Act No. 62 available as
amended in 2014 at https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014C00382.
96 Alec Christie & Jacques Jacobs, The Regulatory and Legal Risks of Cyber Crime,
AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF COMPANY DIRECTORS (June 1, 2014), http://www.companydirector
s.com.au/director-resource-centre/publications/company-director-magazine/2014-back-editio
ns/une/opinion-the-regulatory-and-legal-risks-of-cyber-crime.
"A prudential regulator of banks, insurance companies and superannuation funds, credit
unions, buildings societies and friendly societies." "The Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority (APRA) oversees bank, credit unions, building societies, general insurance and
reinsurance companies, life insurance, private health insurance, friendly societies and most
members of the superannuation industry." Australian Prudential Regulation Authority,
htl://apra.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
Christie & Jacobs, supra note 96.
9 Id.
1'0 Id. (internal quotations omnitted).
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and diligence under the Corporations Act." 01  This would include
monitoring and reviewing a company's risk management and data security
policieS. 102 The legislative framework in Australia allows the Commissioner
to "commence an investigation without a complaint," 103 allowing broad
coverage capabilities to the regulatory body.
Those charged with violating the provision may face civil penalty fines
"[five] times the amount of the pecuniary penalty specified for the civil
penalty provision" or "the amount of the pecuniary penalty specified for the
civil penalty provision. "'" Moreover, under Section 98 of the Privacy Act,
the Commissioner may apply to the Federal Courts for an injunction against
the company in violation. os Each civil penalty provision specifies a
maximum penalty for contravention of that provision. The penalty is
expressed in terms of " enalty units." The value of a penalty as of March
2015 is $180 per unit.' 6 According to the Privacy Act, fines may range
anywhere from 500 penalty units, for low-end offenders, to 2,000 penalty
units for serious or repeated violations of the Act.1 0 7 One drawback to the
penalty system used by Australia is that the fines are not used to compensate
individuals who have been adversely affected by the violation.'
Australia also has a regulatory body in place to address issues related to
cybercrime. This regulatory body, the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC), is analogous to the FTC in many respects.
The ACCC "is an independent Commonwealth statutory authority whose
role is to enforce the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and a range of
additional legislation, promoting competition, fair trading and regulating
national infrastructure for the benefit of all Australians." 09 Like the FTC,
the ACCC is collectively referred to as "the Commission" and has decision
making authority; issues handled by the ACCC may also result in litigation.
Where legal action is taken, the ACCC "is more likely to proceed to
litigation in circumstances where the conduct is particularly egregious
10 Id
102 id
103 Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Regulatory Action Policy, OFFICE OF THE AusTRALIAN
INFORMATION COMMISSION (June 2015), https://www.oaic.gov.au/resources/about-us/our-regul
atory-approach/privacy-regulatory-action-policy.pdf
104 Australian Privacy Act 1998, pt VIB div 2s 80W para. 5, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Se
ries/C2004AO3712.
105 Id.
106 Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth)s 4AA (Austl.), http://www.austlii.edu.au/aulegis/cth/consol_
act/cal91482/.
107 Privacy Act, supra note 104.
108 Pilgrim, supra note 103.
109 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, About the ACCC, https://www.accc.
gov.au/about-us/australian-competition-consumer-commission/about-the-acec.
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(having regard to the priority factors), where there is reason to be concerned
about future behaviour or where the party involved is unwilling to provide a
satisfactory resolution."'10
In terms of protections to consumers, the ACCC relies heavily on
Schedule II of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 which is commonly
referred to as the Australian Consumer Law (ACL).1' Under Section 18 of
the ACL, the ACCC may have similar unfairness powers since Section 18
allows regulation for statements that are "misleading or deceptive" or are
"likely to mislead or deceive."11 2
But other sections provide additional authority to the ACCC:
section 19(1)(b) applies to false or misleading representations that services
are of a particular standard; section 34 applies to misleading conduct as to
the nature, characteristics, or suitability for purpose of service; section 60
guarantees that services will be rendered with due care and skill, and
section 61 guarantees that services will be reasonably fit for their intended
purpose.113
Nonetheless, the ACCC has not yet utilized a litigation route to enforce
these provisions. However, United States businesses that are critical of the
FTC for not providing any sort of guidance or recommendations regarding
cybersecurity, like LabMD and Wyndham, would not be able to make the
same arguments in Australia. A variety of Australian agencies, in particular
the Australian Signals Directorate, have published a number of cybersecurity
guidance and recommendation measures.'1 4 For example, the Directorate
suggests that businesses develop or utilize a variety of tools to detect
breaches, including anomaly detection systems, intrusion detection systems,
log analysis, network and host IDSs, and system integrity verification."s
110 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Compliance & enforcement policy,
https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/australian-competition-consumer-commission/compliance-
enforcement-policy.
1" Competition and Consumer Act 2010 Schedule 2 (Austl.), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
le is/cth/consol act/caca2010265/sch2.html.
Id.
113 Sean Field, Cybersecurity and the Australian Consumer Law - lessons from the US,
MADDOCKS (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.maddocks.com.au/reading-room/cybersecurity-austr
alian-consumer-law-lessons-america-2/.
114 id
115 See Australian Government, Department of Defense, 2015 Australian Government
Information Security Manual: Controls, http://www.asd.gov.au/publications/InformationSec
urityManual_2015_Controls.pdf.
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2. Case Study: Regulatory Action Against Telstra
Australia's regulatory bodies have used methods to hold Australian
businesses accountable for actions very similar to those in Wyndham, an
administrative penalty against Australian telecommunication carrier Telstra
is illustrative of that point. In November 2013, Chris Chapman, Chair of the
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) issued an
infringement noticell6 against Telstra under Section 572E of the
Telecommunications Act 1997.117 The ACMA issued the notice following
an annual compliance check of the Customer Service Guarantee
benchmarks.' 18  These benchmarks provide safeguards for fixed-line
telephone service customers for connecting telephone service, repairing a
service difficulty, and attending appointments set by customers of the
company.1" 9 Of the nine required benchmarks, Telstra met only seven. 12 0 It
does not appear that Telstra took the regulatory action seriously, however,
because the agency found that "information of 15,775 Telstra customers
from 2009 and earlier was accessible on the internet. This included the
information of 1,257 active silent line customers."l21
On May 24, 2013, the Australian Privacy Commissioner, Timothy
Pilgrim, opened an investigation into Telstra. 122 The investigation focused
on whether Telstra "took reasonable steps to protect customer information
from misuse, loss, unauthorised access, modification or disclosure." 23 In the
end, the Commission made three findings: "[Telstra] failed to take
'reasonable' steps to ensure the security of the personal information it held;
failed to destroy or permanently de-identify that information; and that it
116 Chris Chapman, Chair, Australian Communications and Media Authority, Infringement
Notice: Telstra 2013-001 (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.acma.gov.au/-/media/Networks/For
mal%20warnings/pdf/Telstra%20infringement%20notice%20CSG%2ONov%202013.pdf
" Telecommunications Act 1997, § 572E(l) (Austl.) ("If an authorised infringement notice
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has contravened a particular civil
penalty provision, the authorised infringement notice officer may give to the person an
infringement notice relating to the contravention."), https://www.Comlaw.gov.au/Details/C20
15C00540.
11 See Telecommunications (Customer Service Guarantee) Standard 2011 (Austl.), https://
www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2011 C00791.
119 See Telstra Infringement Notice, supra note 116.
120 id
121 Press Release, OAIC (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-speeches/me
dia-releases/telstra-breaches-privacy-of- 15-775-customers.
122 id.
123 id.
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disclosed personal information for a reason other than its permitted
purpose."l24
These findings provide a useful context when compared to Wyndham
because, in both settings, the companies failed to "take reasonable steps" to
keep the information secure. Moreover,
the operator was also fined AU$10,200 for failing to comply
with a previous ACMA decision on a data breach. In a
December 2011 incident, Telstra was found to have leaked the
names, and in some cases the addresses, of approximately
734,000 Telstra customers, along with the usernames and
passwords of up to 41,000 of those customers online. The
details were found to be publicly available and accessible on
the internet between March 2011 and December 2011.125
In this way, like in Wyndham, both companies had previous incidents that
should have alerted them to the potential for future breaches and the
consequences that would arise if the companies did not act.
Given the breadth and reliance on regulatory regimes in Australia, it
appears that Wyndham's actions would have resulted in fines for the hotel
chain in Australia. Outwardly, Telstra complied with the privacy notice
requirements, 126 which were meant to assure its customers that the
information that it was securing was in fact safe. However, like Wyndham,
Telstra failed to adequately meet the requirements as provided by the
guidelines from the FTC and the Privacy Act in Australia. It follows that the
U.S. guidelines need more teeth; if the guidelines were codified in a way like
the Privacy Act, Wyndham's arguments would seemingly have no weight.
Thus, the United States may need to look at how it informs and requires
businesses to keep information safe in order to better protect consumers and
more aggressively hold businesses accountable for unfair business practices
that make consumer information privy to cyber-attacks.
124 See Timothy Pilgrim, Australian Privacy Commission, Telstra Corporation Limited:
Own Motion Investigation Report, OAIC (Mar. 2014), https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/
commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/telstra-omi-march-2014#conclusion; see also
Jonathan Brandon & Dawinder Sahota, Telstra Rapped for Leaking 16,000 Customers'
Details (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.businesscloudnews.com/2014/03/1 1/telstra-rapped-for-le
aking- 1 6000-customers-details/.
125 id
126 See Telstra Privacy Statement, https://www.telstra.com.au/privacy/privacy-statement.
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B. The United Kingdom and Cybersecurity
The United Kingdom also has regulatory and statutory provisions in place
meant to circumvent attempts by hackers to steal consumer information and
to combat various other threats to cybersecurity. This section outlines how
the U.K. uses government initiatives, regulatory action, and the courts to
hold businesses accountable for unfair business practices resulting in
cybersecurity breaches. The section also concludes with a U.K. case study as
a basis for comparing the Wyndham decision and the Telstra case study.
1. The United Kingdom's Approach
In 2011, the U.K. issued a National Cyber Security Strategy outlining a
number of objectives, including making the U.K. "one of the most secure
places in the world to do business in cyberspace" as well as making the "UK
more resilient to cyber attack and better able to protect [its] interests in
cyberspace."l27 Other important developments in this sector include the
establishment of the U.K.'s National Computer Emergency Response Team
(CERT-UK) to act as the central contact point for international counterparts
in this field.1 28 In addition to sector specific requirements, broad data breach
requirements have been proposed as part of the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR);1 2 9 however, this regulation was proposed over three
years ago and seems to suffer from many of the same political problems as
are active in the United States, including lack of partisan support. 3 0
Statutory regulation is already in effect in the U.K. The Data Retention
and Investigatory Powers Act, enacted in 2014,131 was designed to provide a
platform for regulators to build obligations for businesses regarding
cybersecurity concerns. However, in July 17, 2015, the English High Court
127 United Kingdom, Cyber Security Strategy (Dec. 2014), https://www.gov.uk/govemment/
uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/386093/The_UJK_CyberSecurityStrategyRep
ort onProgress andForwardPlans_-_De_.pdf.
12r Warwick Ashford, UK Finally Launches National Cyber Emergency Team,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/224021722
1I/UK-finally-launches-national-cyber-emergency-team.
129 European Commission, Protection of Personal Data (Sept. 17, 2015), http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/data-protection/indexen.htm.
130 See Mark Young, Cyber Security: UK Government Initiatives and Proposed EU Laws,
UNITED KINGDOM REPORT (May 2015), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publicat
ions/2015/05/cyber security uk governmentinitiativesandjproposed-eulaws.pdf.
131 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (UK), http://www.1egislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2014/27/pdfs/ukpga_20140027 en.pdf.
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declared the Act was inconsistent with EU law, and it was therefore
"disapplied." 3 2
When it comes to personal protection, it appears that the common law
may provide grounds for those aggrieved to seek compensation for a lack of
adequate cybersecurity.
Case law in [the U.K.] already tells us that where an equitable
duty of confidence exists for confidential information, a
parallel duty of care for security can co-exist, within the
common law tort of negligence. The tortious duty for security
wraps a legal envelope around the confidential relationship, to
require the taking of security measures to help preserve the
confidentiality of the information. 133
The most sweeping protection, however, comes from the Data Protection
Act 1998,134 which developed requirements for cybersecurity regulation by
U.K.'s Information Commissioner (ICO). ICO is the United Kingdom's
independent regulatory authority, which was "set up to uphold information
rights in the public interest, promoting openness by public bodies and data
privacy for individuals."l35 While the Act addresses six main principles,136
its first principle relates specifically to fair and lawful practices.
Specifically, the Data Protection Act states that: "Personal data shall be
processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless
(a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and (b) in the case of
sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3 is also
met."l37 The conditions set out in Schedules 2 and 3 are referred to as
"conditions for processing" by the ICO.138 As such, unless some relevant
132 Davis v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC (Admin) 2092 (Eng.),
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/david-davis-and-others-v-secretary-of-state-for-the-hom
e-department/. For an overview of the decision and implications see also Laura Woods,
Explaining the Ruling that Overturned the UK's Data Retention & Investigatory Powers Act,
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (July 17, 2015), http://blogs.1se.ac.uk/
mediapolicyproject/2015/07/17/explaining-the-ruling-that-overturned-the-uks-data-retention-inv
estigative-powers-act/.
133 Stewart Room, Cyber Security Law in the UK, https://stewartroom.co.uk/featured/cyber-
security-law-in-the-uk/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
13 Data Protection Act 1998, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/contents.
13 See INFORMATION COMMISSIONER's OFFICE, https://ico.org.uk (last visited Dec. 17, 2016).
136 Processing Personal Data Fairly and Lawfully (Principle 1), ICO, https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-data-protection/principle-1-fair-and-lawfull (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
1 Data Protection Act Schedule 1, Part 1.
138 The Conditions for Processing, ICO, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-
protection/conditions-for-processing/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
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exemption applies, at least one of the following conditions must be met by
all organizations in the United Kingdom that process personal data:
* The individual whom the personal data is about has
consented to the processing.
* The processing is necessary:
o in relation to a contract which the individual has
entered into; or
o because the individual has asked for something to be
done so they can enter into a contract.
* The processing is necessary because of a legal obligation
that applies to you (except an obligation imposed by a
contract).
* The processing is necessary to protect the individual's
"vital interests". This condition only applies in cases of
life or death, such as where an individual's medical
history is disclosed to a hospital's A&E department
treating them after a serious road accident.
* The processing is necessary for administering justice, or
for exercising statutory, governmental, or other public
functions
* The processing is in accordance with the "legitimate
interests" condition. 3 9
These are more than just suggestions-in order to ensure that organizations
comply with these requirements, the Act specifically mandates that each
organization submit to the register a record outlining exactly what type of
information is being stored, how they are using the data, and the details of
how the organization intends to maintain safety and security of the data.1 4 0
The Act separates data into two categories: personal and sensitive data.
Personal data includes information about names, addresses, medical
information, and banking details. 14 1  Sensitive data, on the other hand,
includes information that is about racial or ethnic identity, political or
religious affiliation, health, sex, or criminal record. 14 2 The difference in the
139 id
140 See the list of six requirements at Data Protection Act: Registration with the Information
Commissioner, GCSE BITESIZE, http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/ict/le gal/Odatapro
tectionactrev3.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
141 Data Protection Act: Types of Personal Data, GCSE BITESIZE, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sc
hools/gcsebitesize/ict/legal/Odataprotectionactrev4.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
142 Id.
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type of data relates to the amount of safeguards that are required, and
notably, there are fewer safeguards for personal data.14 3
What makes the United Kingdom's system unique is that it offers a
personal right of action through the ICO. A person who has their data
processed by an organization has the right to: (1) view the data an
organization holds on them (for a fee); (2) request information be corrected if
incorrect; (3) require that the data not be used in any way that is potentially
harmful or distressing; and (4) require that their data not be used for direct
marketing purposes.14
The biggest threat comes by way of the ICO's ability to hold
organizations accountable through a number of mediums. The main options
include:
* serve information notices requiring organisations to
provide the Information Commissioner's Office with
specified information within a certain time period;
* issue undertakings committing an organisations to a
particular course of action in order to improve its
compliance;
* serve enforcement notices and 'stop now' orders where
there has been a breach, requiring organisations to take (or
refrain from taking) specified steps in order to ensure they
comply with the law;
* conduct consensual assessments (audits) to check
organisations are complying;
* serve assessment notices to conduct compulsory audits to
assess whether organisations processing of personal data
follows good practice;
* issue monetary penalty notices, requiring organisations to
pay up to £500,000145 for serious breaches of the Data
Protection Act occurring on or after 6 April 2010
* prosecute those who commit criminal offences under the
Act; and
* report to Parliament on issues of concern. 146
143 Id.
144 See BBC, supra note 140.
1451 The equivalent of over $750,000.
146 Information Commissioner's Office, Taking Action - data protection, https://ico.org.uk/
about-the-ico/what-we-do/taking-action-data-protection/.
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According to the ICO,
[i]t is clear from the wording of [] the Act that a monetary
penalty notice will only be appropriate in the most serious
situations. Therefore in such cases the monetary penalty must
be sufficiently meaningful to act both as a sanction and also as
a deterrent to prevent non-compliance of similar seriousness in
the future by the contravening person and by others. 14 7
The Act goes one step further; the ICO has the ability to hold directors of
offending companies personally liable in certain circumstances, putting
serious pressure on companies to comply with the Act's sweeping
language.1 48
The ICO has included a number of examples of ways in which an
organization would be in serious contravention of the Act, warranting a fine.
One example given "failure by a data controller to take adequate security
measures (use of encrypted files and devices, operational procedures,
,,149
guidance etc.) resulting in the loss of a compact disc holding person data.
The ICO made it clear that it was willing to use this power when it recently
fined the Pregnancy Advice Service £200,0150o for its failure to secure a
website.15 1
2. Case Studies: To Settle, Win, or Pay Up?
Cybersecurity regulation in the U.K. seems to be in a similar position as
in the United States. At first, it appeared that some of the U.K. businesses
might resist the regulatory regime, but in the end most of those cases have
settled. For instance, Sony'5 2 and Marks & Spencerl 5 3 both dropped their
147 Information Commissioner's Office, Information Commissioner's Guidance About the
Issue of Monetary Penalties Prepared and Issued Under Section 55c (1) of the Data
Protection Act 1998, at 6 (Dec. 2015), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1
043720/ico-guidance-on-monetary-penalties.pdf.
148 Alison Deighton, Directors to Be Personally Liable for Marketing Breaches, TLT
SOLICITORS (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.titsolicitors.com/insights-and-events/insight/director
s-to-be-personally-liable-for-nuisane.calls/.
149 Id. at 10.
150 Approximately 300,000 U.S. Dollars.
1s1 Information Commissioner's Office, supra note 147.
152 Out-Law, ICO Fines Sony £250,000 over Security Failings that Exposed 'Millions' of UK
Customers' Personal Data (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2013/january/ic
o-fines-sony-250000-over-security-failings-that-exposed-millions-of-uk-customers-personal-dat
a/.
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respective cases and settled. This kind of response mimics that in the United
States, even with the recent Wyndham decision. As previously noted, the
FTC has settled over fifty cases with businesses regarding cybersecurity
issues. 15 4  This idea is illustrative of a few aspects of both regulatory
regimes: first, that it might just be cheaper to pay the regulating body when
you have a breach than it is to address the heart of the problem; and
alternatively, this may mean the regulation is working and businesses will
eventually comply.
Interestingly, one business has successfully been able to appeal a decision
by the ICO. A U.K. tribunal in August 2013 decided that the ICO "was
wrong to impose a E250,000 fine on [the] Scottish Borders Council."155 The
case centers around an "incident where pension records of former Council
employees were discovered overflowing from recycling bins outside a local
supermarket." 15 6  In the end, the Tribunal determined that while the
infraction was serious, it was "not. . . likely to cause substantial damage or
substantial distress," a requirement for imposing a penalty.157 What is
important to consider in this case is the regulations in the U.K.; namely, the
self-reporting requirements. Should businesses be required to report a
potential violation? And if they fail to report, should they be treated more
harshly under the eyes of the regulation? The Tribunal's opinion is
illustrative:
The Tribunal decision includes a number of interesting
comments under the heading "Unfinished Business." In
particular, it suggests consideration should be given as to
whether self-reporting is a relevant factor in the exercise of the
penalty discretion - in the UK it is not mandatory to report a
breach, but ICO decision notices indicate that a failure to self-
report is regarded as an aggravating factor when determining
the penalty it imposes.15s
153 Tom Young, M&S Appeal Dropped as it Encrypts Laptops, COMPUTING (Sept. 25, 2008),
ht://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/1 829583/m-s-appeal-dropped-encrypts-laptops.
See Pearson, supra note 5.
155 Mac Macmillan, UK Council Successfully Appeals ICO Fine Arising from Processor
Breach, CHRoN. DATA PROTECTION (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.hldataprotection.com/2013/
09/articles/employment-privacy/local-council-successfully-appeals-against-ico-fine/.
156 Id.
157 Scottish Borders Council v. Information Commissioner, EA/2012/0212, http://www.inf
ormationtribunal.gov.uk/DBFiles/Decision/il068/Scottish%2OBorders%2Council% 2 0EA.20
12.0212%20%28210813%29%20Preliminary/o20Decision.pdf
158 See Macmillan, supra note 155.
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What should happen if a business unsuccessfully appeals? A U.K.
business, Reactive Media recently found out. The ICO served Reactive
Media with £50,000 fine for a breach where "more than 600 complaints
concerning unsolicited marketing phone calls made by the company were
received by the ICO."159 Reactive Media "found itself facing a 50% increase
in the fine it was attempting to overturn after an appeal." 16 0  On appeal,
Reactive argued that "there was no evidence that its communications had
caused 'substantial damage or distress', and that as it 'offered a service to the
public, it had a right to trade, [and] it was trading well in an area of high
unemployment.' ,161 However, the Tribunal disagreed, feeling that the ICO
was able to accurately determine the Reactive's finances, so it unanimously
held that a E75,000 fine was more appropriate. 162
This 2015 decision may suggest that the tides are changing in the U.K.
Historically, ICO decisions like these are rarely upheld, so this decision
could prove to be the impetus required for companies to become more
compliant with their privacy requirements. The ICO has already hinted that
it will start to issue more fines to deter unsolicited marketing activities;
organizations should therefore be aware that privacy-related incidents will no
longer be tolerated.1 63 The same could be said for the Third Circuit's
decision in Wyndham. Courts have been reluctant to allow businesses to
circumvent the FTC's determinations, and instead have held them
accountable for situations where they have participated in unfair business
practices. While it seems unlikely that a U.S. court would increase the fines
imposed by the FTC, a feature in the statutes that impose additional fines on
unsuccessful appeals may be used as an additional deterrent, thus making
businesses more likely to comply with cybersecurity regulation.
C. Are These Efforts Working?
In the face of rising threats to cybersecurity, naturally the question arises:
are these efforts of the other common law countries working? The
regulations and framework implemented in the United Kingdom appear to be
a step in the right direction, and the U.K. government is continuing to invest
in ways to address cyber risks. In a recent speech at the GCH intelligence
159 Cynthia O'Donoghue, Kate Brimsted & Chantelle Taylor, Reactive Media Fine
Increased on Appeal by UK Information Rights Tribunal, REED SMITH TECHNOLOGY LAW
DISPATCH (July 10, 2015), http://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2015/07/privacy-data-prot
ection/reactiv-media-fine-increased-on-appeal-by-uk-information-rights-tribunal/.
160 id
161 id.
162 id
163 See Deighton supra note 148.
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agency, Chancellor George Osborne named the technology section as an area
of priority for the government. 16 4  "Osborne announced a plan to nearly
double spending on cyber security investment[s], bring[ing] the total to more
than E3.2 billion,"l 65 maintaining that the United Kingdom is dedicated to
developing "a bold, comprehensive [program] that will give Britain the next
generation of cyber security, and make Britain one of the safest places to do
business [online]."l66
Despite these efforts, the respective governments are mindful of the
numbers. Recall, the United Kingdom saw an increase in lost revenues from
$5.93 million last year to $6.32 this year as a result of cybersecurity
threats.' 67  Australia experienced a slight decrease from $3.99 million to
$3.47 million.1 68 "[J]ust twenty-three Australian businesses were surveyed,"
however and this relatively small sample size may explain why Australia
fared better than its common law counterparts.1 69
The attack really needs to be on two fronts. As the Ponemon study
articulates, the various costs associated with cybercrime can be "moderated
by the use of security intelligence systems (including SIEM). Findings
suggest [that] companies using security intelligence technologies were more
efficient in detecting and containing cyber-attacks. As a result, these
companies enjoyed an average cost savings of $1.9 million when compared
to companies not deploying security intelligence technologies." 7  If
Ponemon is right, this severely undercuts any argument by United States
companies who see the FTC's actions against Wyndham as a serious threat
to American business.
V. How TO RESPOND TO THE INCREASED RISK OF CYBERATTACKS
A. Is the Current United States Model Enough?
While the FTC may have support from the courts, it does not appear that
the current model will be able to keep up with the increasing threats to
'" Natasha Lomas, U.K. Gov't to Invest $250M in Cyber Security Start Up to Help Spooks,
TECH CRUNCH (Nov. 18, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/11/18/uk-gov-to-invest-in-securit
y-startups/.
165 Over 4.8 billion U.S. Dollars.
1 See Lomas, supra note 164.
167 Ponemon Institute, supra note 1.
168 Id.
169 Beverly Head, The True Cost ofa Cyber Security Breach in Australia, COMPUTER WKLY.
(Oct. 2015), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/4500254729/The-true-cost-of-a-cyber-se
curity-breach-in-Australia.
170 Ponemon Institute, supra note 1, at 19.
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consumer information. The staggering numbers from the Ponemon Institute
study, coupled with the countless articles about cyber threats flashing across
the news headlines suggests the United States is in need of a system that
draws on all of the strengths of these three countries' systems.
Foremost, the United States needs to continue to try to educate businesses
and consumers on how to protect information. Consider Australia's plan
regarding cybersecurity, which seems to be heavily focused on education.1 7 1
While Australia's system may be too focused on the education aspect,
informing consumers and businesses about ways to avoid attacks could
reduce attackers' ability to steal information. While this should not be the
centerpiece of the American system, it surely should be a tool that the FTC
can use to reduce the number of attacks each year.
Second, the FTC, or even the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
could benefit from legislation that has more grit. While there is currently
proposed legislation 7 2 regarding cybersecurity, it is directed at an issue
altogether different than the one principally discussed in this Note. Rather,
the proposed legislation seems to target the sharing of information with other
countries in order to strengthen the ability of governments to go after
attackers. 173
Improving information security should fundamentally involve securing
information, yet all the current proposals involve greater information sharing
with intelligence agencies. "Why are the same agencies that have been
shown to be active in undermining the information security of private
firms ... and all of their customers ... as a consequence of these actions,
being tasked with better securing our information?" 74
While the United States, the U.K. and Australia would benefit from this
type of information exchange, it would fail to address the underlying
systemic issue. Arguably, the FTC has the authority to go after these
businesses like it did in Wyndham, but more detailed legislation may remove
some of the obstacles in place against the FTC to better enable the
Commission to get businesses to implement best practices when it comes to
cybersecurity protection. While the guidelines provide a starting base, they
lack the enforcement strength needed to hold businesses accountable when
they fail to meet the guidelines.
'n' See Cyber Security Strategy 2009, supra note 90, at 6.
172 See the proposed legislation discussed supra note 30.
173 See the proposed legislation discussed supra note 30.
174 Benjamin Dean, Why Companies Have Little Incentive to Invest in Cybersecurity, THE
CONVERSATION (Mar. 4, 2015), http://theconversation.com/why-companies-have-little-incenti
ve-to-invest-in-cybersecurity-37570.
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Finally, the FTC needs to more actively pursue businesses who fail to
have effective cybersecurity protections. This serves a number of functions:
first, it will likely lead to more policy opinions by the FTC which would
guide businesses on what is expected. While the most effective means would
be better served from avoiding a potential ad hoc determination of what is
required from businesses. Second, the increased pressure by the regulatory
arm might incentivize businesses to find ways to keep consumer information
safe instead of being met with fines. Finally, the FTC will need to continue
to monitor and work with individuals and businesses who specialize in
keeping information safe from hackers. As technology continues to evolve,
the FTC will have to continue to meet the growing demands and threats. By
actively and continually monitoring cybersecurity, the FTC could potentially
increase the use of better cybersecurity protections, thereby reducing the
large sums spent each year on cyber-related attacks.
B. Cyber Insurance-Buyer Beware
Are there ways that businesses can advance these goals? While the
government attempts to create better security practices online, some
businesses have begun to invest in cyber insurance. In places like the United
Kingdom, directors can be personally liable. 17 5 Insurance in the U.K. is
likely attractive for two reasons: first, it mitigates the costs to the company
(and potentially to directors) and second, it a company's reputation is
improved when it provides assurance to its customers.
While there are many benefits, however, insurance has its drawbacks.
Particularly in the U.K. where directors may be held personally liable,
having insurance may act as a disincentive for companies to address the roots
of their problems.17 6 Instead of finding better ways to monitor and secure
information, companies are spreading the cost to the consumers while failing
to address the reasons why insurance is needed. Moreover, very little
historical actuarial data exists, so when it comes to pricing premiums for
companies, serious challenges exist for finding appropriate premium costS. 17 7
Security professionals are starting to warn businesses not to rely on
cybersecurity insurance to address the increased risks of cyber-attacks.
175 For more about cyber insurance and an example of a reaction see Elliot Shear,
Cybersecurity-"The Directors of 98% of UK Companies Are in Breach of Their Statutory
Duties, " W LEGAL (Feb. 7, 2017, http://wlegal.co.uk/cybersecurity-the-directors-of-uk-compa
nies/.
176 Tim Holman, Security Think Tank: Cyber Insurance - Buyers Beware, COMPUTER WKLY.
(Oct. 2013), http://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/Security-Think-Tank-Cyber-insurance-
buers-beware.
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Notably, one of the largest insurance providers said that "cyber attacks are
now so dangerous to global businesses that governments should step in to
cover the risks."'7 8 Arguably, directors have very little incentive to invest in
cybersecurity, particularly in the United States because no such current risks
fall upon them.
There are also some great misconceptions surrounding the actual
coverage that current insurance provides to the companies. Namely, many
individuals think that the policies include insurance for data theft and loss.
"In the UK, at least, data is not considered a tangible asset that one can steal,
hence [there is] computer misuse and data protection law to cover these
eventualities."l 79  This creates a greater uncertainty as to whether an
individual should seek out personal data insurance coverage, or whether the
coverage and policies purchased by customers will in fact be able to handle
the potentially large payouts that would result from any sort of substantial
breach.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, these governments need to find ways to make the idea of
cybersecurity investment desirable. Recently, President Barack Obama
announced that he was seeking $14 billion to tackle the issue, but this does
not address the heart of the issue. 8 0 Rather than creating various incentives
for businesses to invest in stronger security measures, the United States (as
well as Australia and the United Kingdom) is introducing proposals for more
information sharing with intelligence agencies.81 If these countries want to
limit access to consumer information and hold businesses accountable for
unfair or deceptive practices which enable to hackers to take this sensitive
information, then the attack needs to be on more fronts. Countries like the
U.K., which name the technology sector an area of priority for the
government 82 without implementing laws and regulations that force
businesses to adopt better practices, are failing to address critical issues.
The government that is best able to educate consumers and businesses,
create incentives for businesses to comply with effective statutory and
regulatory action, and continue to pressure businesses to meet compliance
standards will likely see the greatest defense to cyber-attacks. The decision
178 Id.
179 id.
180 AFCEA, The Need to Shave: The U.S. Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement (Apr.
2007), http://www.afcea.org/mission/inel/documents/Springlntel07whitepaper 000.pdf.
181 Id
182 Lomas, supra note 164.
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in Wyndham may help push that agenda because it signifies to businesses
that the FTC has the support of the courts in enforcing these types of
decisions. This demonstrates the need for a full and comprehensive attack by
the government: the legislative, judicial, and executive need a comprehensive
interconnected plan if meaningful change is to occur in this sector.

